000			02991 2200265 4500
001			408919
090			_a408919
100			_a20241016d kkky0pory50 ba
101			_aeng
102			_aGB
200			_aLong-Term Incarceration and the Moral Limits of Punishment _fJacob Bronsther
210			_aLondon _cLondon School of Economics and Political Science _d2018
215			_a293 p. _d30 cm
328			_aA thesis submitted to the Law Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
330			_aThis thesis, inquiring into the permissibility of long-term incarceration, maintains that two sets of reasons determine the moral limits of punishment. First, the reasons that justify the infliction of penal harm will only license “proportionate” or “parsimonious” means of realizing our penal aims. Part I, searching for these reasons, conceives of the criminal law as a system of protections, upon which all citizens rely for their assured liberty. An offender weakens this system by contributing to the threat of “criminality.” The state is thereby entitled, and only entitled, to harm him as a means of “erasing” his criminality contributions, generally by deterring would-be future offenders. This precludes long-term incarceration in most, but not all cases, given the tenuous relationship between penal severity and deterrence. The second set of reasons opposes degrading punishments. Is long-term incarceration impermissibly degrading, irrespective of its proportionality or usefulness otherwise? Part II gains traction by considering torture, the exemplar of degrading treatment. I define torture as the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. I argue that it is egregiously “disrespectful” of the human capacity to realize value. It converts a diachronic being capable of building a good life through time into a synchronic being whose awareness is restricted to a maximally terrible present. Meanwhile, a prison sentence is “long-term,” I argue, if it severely risks ruining an inmate’s life, just in virtue of the amount of time that he is separated from society and thereby deprived of certain associational goods (e.g. a family and career). Long-term incarceration for reasons of retribution or deterrence intentionally inflicts this life-ruining harm. It is thus impermissibly disrespectful of a person’s value-generating capacities, I conclude, akin to penal torture. Long-term incarceration for the reason of incapacitation, however, whereby the state is not motivated to harm the offender, can be legitimate.
606			_97061 _aPENA DE PRISÃO DE LONGA DURAÇÃO
606			_95182 _aPUNIÇÃO
606			_93523 _aDIREITOS HUMANOS
606			_95155 _aTESE DE DOUTORAMENTO
675			_9319986 _a343.24
700			_9423213 _aBRONSTHER _bJacob
801			_aPT _gRPC
852			_jEST1264