000			02100nam a2200277 4500
001			393783
010			_a9789289911344 ; ISSN 17252806
090			_a393783
100			_a20160310d2014 y0pory50 ba
101			_aeng
200			_aBanks, shadow banking, and fragility _bRecurso eletrónico _fStephan Luck, Paul Schempp
210			_aFrankfurt am Main _cEuropean Central Bank _d2014
215			_a1 CD-ROM _d12 cm
225			_aWorking Paper Series _v1726
300			_aFicheiro de 0,99 MB em formato PDF (39 p.). Disponível também em: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1726.pdf?c3e13c57f91d8bf9d4065042337eb10c. Acedido a 10 de março de 2016.
330			_a"This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines the stability of the financial system. If the shadow banking sector is small relative to the capacity of secondary markets for shadow banks' assets, shadow banking is stable. In turn, if the sector grows too large, it becomes fragile: an additional equilibrium emerges that is characterized by a panic-based run in the shadow banking sector. Second, if regulated commercial banks themselves operate shadow banks, a larger shadow banking sector is sustainable. However, once the threat of a crisis reappears, a crisis in the shadow banking sector spreads to the commercial banking sector. Third, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, a safety net for banks may fail to prevent a banking crisis. Moreover, the safety net may be tested and may eventually become costly for the regulator."
606			_aMERCADO FINANCEIRO _9227061
606			_aTRANSACÇÃO FINANCEIRA _9343169
606			_aINTERMEDIÁRIO FINANCEIRO _9316718
606			_aSISTEMA FINANCEIRO _9245947
700			_aLUCK _bStephan _9358046
701			_aSCHEMPP _bPaul _9358047
955			_xOferta