000			01603nam a2200205 4500
001			376578
090			_a376578
100			_a20170413u y0pory50 ba
101			_aeng
200			_aCognitive science in the courtroom _fNeil Levy
311			_aResumo inserto na publicação.
330			_aThere is extensive evidence from cognitive science that the judgments of individuals, whether legal experts like judges or the laypeople who constitute juries, are predictably unreliable under many circumstances. We have retributive impulses that may distort our judgments; we are over-impressed by eyewitness testimony and by recollection, given how faulty each source of evidence often is; we attribute intentions to agents based on irrelevant considerations, and so on. Since these biases ensure that we make predictable mistakes, it is incumbent on the law to take them into account. In this paper, l review the evidence for these distortions and suggest possible responses. Subjective evidence should be replaced, where possible, with objective; factors (like race) known to mitigate the harshness of judgments should be regarded instead as mitigating factors to compensate, and we should investigate the possibility of using statistical rules to replace individual judgment.
461			_cCoimbra _dJaneiro-Junho 2016 _vNº 3 _tAnatomia do crime _x2183-4180 _pp. 169-182
606			_aCIÊNCIAS DO COMPORTAMENTO _91361
606			_aJULGAMENTO _9233424
606			_aDEPOIMENTO _9318693
700			_aLEVY _bNeil _9308720