| 000 | 01776nam a2200217 4500 | ||
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| 001 | 363002 | ||
| 090 | _a363002 | ||
| 100 | _a20150812u y0pory50 ba | ||
| 101 | _aeng | ||
| 200 |
_aMoney laundering regulation _bRecurso eletrónico _efrom Al Capote to Al Qaeda _fBrigitte Unger |
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| 311 | _aIn: Handbook on the politics of regulation / editor by David Levi-Faur. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2011. p. 615-628. Ficheiro de 1,05 MB em formato PDF (15 p.). | ||
| 463 | _tIn: Handbook on the politics of regulation / editor by David Levi-Faur. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2011. p. 615-628. Ficheiro de 1,05 MB em formato PDF (15 p.).. | ||
| 330 | _aThe characteristics of the problem to be regulated. Victimless crime. No direct effects of laundering. Ambiguous relation between money laundering and terrorism financing. Unknown size of the problem. A global phenomenon. The political economy of money laundering. Lack of private interest for regulating money laundering. Public interest theory of regulation and US interests. The regulatory responses. The reporting system and problems with it. Seeking for alliances and expanding regulation: from the war on drugs to the war on terror. Setting an international standard for money laundering: the forty plus nine recommendations. Enforcement, effectiveness, and legitimacy problems. Instruments to achieve countries' compliance. Some regulatory weakness. Effectiveness. Legitimacy problems. Conclusions. Bibliography. | ||
| 606 |
_aBRANQUEAMENTO DE CAPITAIS _9243734 |
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| 606 |
_aFINANCIAMENTO DO TERRORISMO _9304518 |
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| 606 |
_aPOLÍTICA CRIMINAL _9231088 |
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| 606 |
_aUNIÃO EUROPEIA _9224774 |
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| 606 |
_aESTADOS UNIDOS _9334103 |
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| 700 |
_aUNGER _bBrigitte _9343151 |
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