02128nam a2200253 4500001000700000010003400007090001100041100004100052101000800093200009100101210005100192215002000243225003100263300019600294330106500490606003101555606003801586606003901624606003101663700002601694701002601720955001101746995011701757393783 a9789289911344 ; ISSN 17252806 a393783 a20160310d2014 y0pory50 ba aeng aBanks, shadow banking, and fragilitybRecurso eletrónicofStephan Luck, Paul Schempp aFrankfurt am MaincEuropean Central Bankd2014 a1 CD-ROMd12 cm aWorking Paper Seriesv1726 aFicheiro de 0,99 MB em formato PDF (39 p.). Disponível também em: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1726.pdf?c3e13c57f91d8bf9d4065042337eb10c. Acedido a 10 de março de 2016. a"This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines the stability of the financial system. If the shadow banking sector is small relative to the capacity of secondary markets for shadow banks' assets, shadow banking is stable. In turn, if the sector grows too large, it becomes fragile: an additional equilibrium emerges that is characterized by a panic-based run in the shadow banking sector. Second, if regulated commercial banks themselves operate shadow banks, a larger shadow banking sector is sustainable. However, once the threat of a crisis reappears, a crisis in the shadow banking sector spreads to the commercial banking sector. Third, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, a safety net for banks may fail to prevent a banking crisis. Moreover, the safety net may be tested and may eventually become costly for the regulator." aMERCADO FINANCEIRO9227061 aTRANSACÇÃO FINANCEIRA9343169 aINTERMEDIÁRIO FINANCEIRO9316718 aSISTEMA FINANCEIRO9245947 aLUCKbStephan9358046 aSCHEMPPbPaul9358047 xOferta 104PJCD_276_00000000000000052022-06-066PJCD2769426258aPJcPJfPJ1CD276_1kPJCD276n2022-06-06o0rMOxOferta