02100nam a2200277 4500 393783 9789289911344 ; ISSN 17252806 393783 20160310d2014 y0pory50 ba eng Banks, shadow banking, and fragility Recurso eletrónico Stephan Luck, Paul Schempp Frankfurt am Main European Central Bank 2014 1 CD-ROM 12 cm Working Paper Series 1726 Ficheiro de 0,99 MB em formato PDF (39 p.). Disponível também em: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1726.pdf?c3e13c57f91d8bf9d4065042337eb10c. Acedido a 10 de março de 2016. "This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines the stability of the financial system. If the shadow banking sector is small relative to the capacity of secondary markets for shadow banks' assets, shadow banking is stable. In turn, if the sector grows too large, it becomes fragile: an additional equilibrium emerges that is characterized by a panic-based run in the shadow banking sector. Second, if regulated commercial banks themselves operate shadow banks, a larger shadow banking sector is sustainable. However, once the threat of a crisis reappears, a crisis in the shadow banking sector spreads to the commercial banking sector. Third, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, a safety net for banks may fail to prevent a banking crisis. Moreover, the safety net may be tested and may eventually become costly for the regulator." MERCADO FINANCEIRO 227061 TRANSACÇÃO FINANCEIRA 343169 INTERMEDIÁRIO FINANCEIRO 316718 SISTEMA FINANCEIRO 245947 LUCK Stephan 358046 SCHEMPP Paul 358047 Oferta 0 PJCD_276_000000000000000 2022-06-06 PJCD276 426258 PJ PJ PJ1CD276_1 PJCD276 2022-06-06 0 MO Oferta