02567nam a2200253   4500001000700000090001100007100004100018101000800059200010000067210003900167215002000206300041000226330130600636606003801942606003901980606003302019606001702052606003002069606002802099606002702127700003002154955001102184995011802195392900  a392900  a20141209d2012       y0pory50      ba  aeng  aAl Qaeda and the Arab SpringbRecurso eletrónicoean ideological assessmentfW. Kimball Lewis  aMonterey, Californiac[s.n.]d2012  a1 CD-ROMd12 cm  aTese submetida como requisito parcial para a obtenção do grau de "Master of science in information operations", apresentada à "Naval Postgraduate School", tendo como orientadores Glenn E. Robinson e Randy P. Burkett. Resumo inserto na publicação. Ficheiro de 575 KB em formato PDF (104 p.). Também disponível através de: https://hdl.handle.net/10945/27859. Acedido a 9 de Dezembro de 2014.  aThe Arab Spring of 2011 resulted in widespread unrest as Muslims protested against long-standing, oppressive regimes. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain found themselves at a crossroads between reform and chaos. The Muslim Ummah was ripe for influence from provocative voices such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s rhetoric failed to capitalize on this golden opportunity, however. It issued a number of statements to the people of the Muslim world that demonstrated its inability to find relevance during this time of change. Its narrative of jihad against the “Far Enemy” failed to resonate with Tunisians who sought greater economic opportunity, with Egyptians who wanted greater self-determination, or with Libyans who were joined by Western nations to topple Gaddafi. To Bahrainis, who underwent a struggle for change against King Khalifa and his security forces, Al Qaeda was notably silent. Al Qaeda and its affiliates missed this golden opportunity to reverse the decline in support it had experienced since September 11, 2001. Its statements reveal a lack of new ideas and older ones that are often inconsistent among its affiliates, and expose fissures within the network. As its messaging demonstrates, Al Qaeda likely will experience continued decline and marginalization in the years to come.  aORGANIZAÇÃO TERRORISTA999993  aFUNDAMENTALISMO ISLÂMICO9343174  aIDEOLOGIA POLÍTICA9266546  aTESE9334284  aÁFRICA DO NORTE9348854  aMÉDIO ORIENTE9343126  aESTADOS UNIDOS9334103  aLEWISbW. Kimball9357538  xOferta  104PJCD_259_00000000000000052022-06-066PJCD2599425291aPJcPJfPJ1CD259_16kPJCD259n2022-06-06o0rMOxOferta