03744nam a2200241   4500001000700000100004100007101000800048200015200056210007800208215002000286225002600306300122800332330172401560606002003284606002503304606002403329606003003353606003003383606002003413606001903433606003203452700001803484390689  a20111124d2009       y0pory50      ba  aeng  aInformal value transfer systems and criminal organizationsbRecurso eletrónicoea study into so-called underground banking networksfNikos Passas  aNetherlandscResearch and Documentation Centre. Ministry of Justiced2009  a1 CD-ROMd12 cm  aWorking Paper Series   aFicheiro de 194 Kb em formato pdf (93 p.). Study commissioned by the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice on the advice of the Advisory Committee for Research on Organized Crime. "This is the first systematic study into so-called "underground banking" networks. The research was funded by the Ministry of Justice of The Netherlands. It is the study that coined the term "Informal value transfer systems". The main goals of the study were to provide a policy-useful analysis of the way in which such systems operate, the extent to which criminals may resort to their services, and the policies adopted by different governments. The paper reviews hawala, black market peso exchange, fei chien and related IVTS used by various ethnic communities for remittances and trade. The study finds that both legitimate and illegitimate interests are served by IVTS. Regulators need to be cautious and avoid ethnocentric approaches that may bring about counter-productive effects with respect to economic development and crime control". Também disponível através de: https://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/informal-value-transfer-systems-and-criminal-organizations.aspx. Acedido a 24 de janeiro de 2012.  aPreface. Contents. Abbreviations. Executive summary. 1 Introduction. 1.1 Definitions: “underground” banking or Informal Value Transfer Systems? 2 The origins of IVTS. 2.1 Hawala / hundi. 2.2 Chinese IVTS — fei ch’ien. 2.3 Chits and chops. 2.4 “Facts by repetition” and other inaccuracies regarding IVTS modi operandi. 2.5 The Colombian black market for pesos. 3 Causes for continued use of IVTS. 4 Where IVTS can be found. 4.1 Paraguay. 4.2 Surinam. 4.3 Jamaica. 4.4 Trinidad and Tobago. 4.5 Turkey. 4.6 Nepal. 4.7 Hong Kong. 4.8 Japan. 4.9 Thailand. 4.10 Sri Lanka. 4.11 Canada. 4.12 USA. 5 Use of IVTS by criminals. 5.1 Intellectual property/piracy. 5.2 Arms. 5.3 Drugs. 5.4 Smuggling of illegal immigrants. .5.5 Kidnapping. 5.6 Tax evasion/currency control law violations. 5.7 Illegal trade in body parts. 5.8 Money laundering. 5.9 Intelligence operations. 5.10 “Trading with the enemy”. 5.11 Corruption. 5.12 Corruption/terrorism. 5.13 Fraud. 5.14 Effects of IVTS. 5.15 Criminals’ alternatives. 6 Extent, growth and concern. 6.1 Extent and growth. 6.2 Concern. 7 Measures taken. 7.1 The Netherlands. 7.2 United Kingdom. 7.3 Germany. 7.4 USA. 7.5 Canada. 7.6 Jamaica. 7.7 Colombia. 7.8 Australia. 7.9 Singapore. 7.10 Taiwan. 7.11 South Africa. 7.12 Hong Kong. 7.13 China. 7.14 Japan. 7.15 Philippines. 7.16 Vietnam. 7.17 India. 7.18 Pakistan. 8 Research implications. 9 Conclusions and policy recommendations. 9.1 Regulatory measures. 9.2 Criminal law. 9.3 Public policy measures. 9.4 Training issues. 9.5 Organizational measures. 9.6 Evaluation methods. References. Appendix 1 List of interviewees. Appendix 2 Search items. Appendix 3 Additional sources consulted (not included in the references).  aEVASÃO FISCAL  aANÁLISE FINANCEIRA  aPOLÍTICA CRIMINAL  aORGANIZAÇÃO CRIMINOSA  aBRANQUEAMENTO DE CAPITAIS  aESTUDO DE CASOS  aREDE CRIMINOSA  aFINANCIAMENTO DO TERRORISMO  aPASSASbNikos