01445nam a2200157   4500001000700000100004100007101000800048200005000056311003800106330098500144461008101129606003201210606001501242606001501257700001501272376578  a20170413u           y0pory50      ba  aeng  aCognitive science in the courtroomfNeil Levy  aResumo inserto na publicação.  aThere is extensive evidence from cognitive science that the judgments of individuals, whether legal experts like judges or the laypeople who constitute juries, are predictably unreliable under many circumstances. We have retributive impulses that may distort our judgments; we are over-impressed by eyewitness testimony and by recollection, given how faulty each source of evidence often is; we attribute intentions to agents based on irrelevant considerations, and so on. Since these biases ensure that we make predictable mistakes, it is incumbent on the law to take them into account. In this paper, l review the evidence for these distortions and suggest possible responses. Subjective evidence should be replaced, where possible, with objective; factors (like race) known to mitigate the harshness of judgments should be regarded instead as mitigating factors to compensate, and we should investigate the possibility of using statistical rules to replace individual judgment.  cCoimbradJaneiro-Junho 2016vNº 3tAnatomia do crimex2183-4180pp. 169-182  aCIÊNCIAS DO COMPORTAMENTO  aJULGAMENTO  aDEPOIMENTO  aLEVYbNeil