01758nam a2200205   4500001000700000090001100007100004100018101000800059200009800067311016700165463016900332330082400501606003001325606003201355606002401387606002101411606001901432700002001451995008101471363002  a363002  a20150812u           y0pory50      ba  aeng  aMoney laundering regulationbRecurso eletrónicoefrom Al Capote to Al QaedafBrigitte Unger  aIn: Handbook on the politics of regulation / editor by David Levi-Faur. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2011. p. 615-628. Ficheiro de 1,05 MB em formato PDF (15 p.).  tIn: Handbook on the politics of regulation / editor by David Levi-Faur. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, 2011. p. 615-628. Ficheiro de 1,05 MB em formato PDF (15 p.)..   aThe characteristics of the problem to be regulated. Victimless crime. No direct effects of laundering. Ambiguous relation between money laundering and terrorism financing. Unknown size of the problem. A global phenomenon. The political economy of money laundering. Lack of private interest for regulating money laundering. Public interest theory of regulation and US interests. The regulatory responses. The reporting system and problems with it. Seeking for alliances and expanding regulation: from the war on drugs to the war on terror. Setting an international standard for money laundering: the forty plus nine recommendations. Enforcement, effectiveness, and legitimacy problems. Instruments to achieve countries' compliance. Some regulatory weakness. Effectiveness. Legitimacy problems. Conclusions. Bibliography.  aBRANQUEAMENTO DE CAPITAIS  aFINANCIAMENTO DO TERRORISMO  aPOLÍTICA CRIMINAL  aUNIÃO EUROPEIA  aESTADOS UNIDOS  aUNGERbBrigitte  104PJCD_268_00000000000000052022-06-06aPJcPJkPJCD 268n2022-06-06o0rAM