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  <controlfield tag="001">19954</controlfield>
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    <subfield code="a">19954</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">eng</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Old and new actors in the italian drug trade</subfield>
    <subfield code="e">ethnic succession or functional specialization?</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="330" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">The article analyses Italian and foreign organized crime involved in the drug market from two perspectives. The first, called "criminal succession", assumes that the great presence of foreign criminal groups into this illegal market would represent a menace to the traditional hegemony exercised by Mafia-type associations in Italy. From a different perspective, defined as "functional specialisation", the involvement of foreign criminal groups in the drug market could also be seen in terms of criminal "labour  force" tending to follow the same mechanisms occurring in the general market at large, where immigrants fill low-paying jobs not requested by the local population. Through the analysis of data provided by the Italian Central Antidrug Bureau and recent court records the article tests these two perspectives. In particular, the in-depth analysis of three case studies from northern, central and southern Italy - i.e. Milan, Florence and Naples - has allowed us to identify the main changes that occurred in the drug market since the early 1990s. In effect, in Milan and Florence, we register the emergence of foreign criminal actors in the high- and mediumlevel positions of the local drug trade, while in Naples, where Camorra clans hold very strong positions, it leaves small areas of autonomy to foreign criminal groups.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="461" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="v">V.10,n.4</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2004</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">p.257-283</subfield>
    <subfield code="t">European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">Netherlands</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="606" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">GRUPOS VIOLENTOS  CRIME ORGANIZADO  MAFIA  ASSOCIA&#xC7;&#xC3;O MAFIOSA  TR&#xC1;FICO DE DROGA  IT&#xC1;LIA</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">BECUCCI</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">Stefano</subfield>
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    <subfield code="j">P.275</subfield>
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    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
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    <subfield code="5">2021-12-17</subfield>
    <subfield code="9">23283</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">DGRSP</subfield>
    <subfield code="k">P.275</subfield>
    <subfield code="n">2021-12-17</subfield>
    <subfield code="o">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">AP</subfield>
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